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DANA CORPORATION V UNITED STATES: THE
DEDUCTIBILITY OF LEGAL RETAINER FEES
USED TO ACQUIRE A CORPORATION
Alexander F. Kennedy
I. INTRODUCTION
In Dana Corp. v United States,1 the United States Court of Appeals,
Federal Circuit, applied the "origin of the claim test" to hold that a legal
retainer fee paid by a corporation to a law firm is not deductible where
the retainer fee was used to offset nondeductible legal expenses
subsequently incurred in the acquisition of another corporation.2 The
United States Supreme Court previously held in United States v.
Gilmore,3 that to determine the deductibility of legal fees, courts should
look to the origin of the claim giving rise to the legal fees.4 Legal fees,
generally, whether offset against a retainer or not, are either deductible
from the taxpayer's income tax as an "ordinary and necessary business
expense," 5 are permanently nondeductible, or are nondeductible but
I. Dana Corp. v. United States, 174 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cit. 1999).
2. Id. at 1345.
3. United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39 (1963).
4. Id. at 44.
5. 26 U.S.C. § 162(a) (1994); see Dana Corp. v. United States, 38 Fed. Cl. 356, 360 (Ct. Cl.
1999), overruled by Dana Corp. v. United States, 174 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cit. 1999); See also BORIS 1.
BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS 20.3.2 (2d
ed. 1989) The authors state:
The principal function of the term 'ordinary' in §162(a) is to clarify the distinction, often
difficult, between those expenses that are currently deductible and those that are in the
nature of capital expenditures, which, if deductible at all, must be amortized over the
useful life of the asset .... This is because §263(a), denying any deduction for amounts
paid for the acquisition, improvement, or betterment of property, explicitly embodies
'the basic principle that a capital expenditure may not be deducted from current income'
and takes precedence over §162. Moreover, the distinction between deductible expenses
and nondeductible capital expenditures is inherent in both the term 'expenses' and the
statutory phrase 'in carrying on' any trade or business.
Id. (emphasis added).
1
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capitalizable as capital expenditures, 6 depending on the origin of the
claim.7 If the legal fees are capital expenditures, they must be amortized
or depreciated over the life of the relevant asset.8
The IRS gained an important victory in Dana Corp. By convincing
the Federal Circuit that the legal retainer fee was a nondeductible capital
expenditure, the IRS provided that, in the future, companies will find it
more difficult to alter their tax liability on capital expenditures by
deducting the legal fees arising from the acquisition from a prepaid legal
retainer fee as an ordinary and necessary business expense. While Dana
is a significant case on an important subject in taxation, very little has
been written on Dana and the retainer fee issue in Dana.
This Note discusses the Federal Circuit's holding in Dana Corp.
Part II details the important history of the deductibility of legal fees
leading up to Dana Corp.9 Part III provides the factual background of
Dana Corp.10 Part IV explains the court's reasoning in Dana Corp."
Part V analyzes the court's holding in Dana Corp. and explains why it is
ultimately correct. 12
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. United States v. Gilmore and the "Origin of the Claim Test"
In Gilmore, the United States Supreme Court held that the proper
test to determine the deductibility of legal expenses is the "origin of the
claim test."' 3  The plaintiff in Gilmore brought suit to recover alleged
overpayments of his federal income tax. 14  The plaintiff had recently
been divorced from his wife. 15 In the divorce proceeding the plaintiff
successfully defended his wife's claims for half his stockholdings. 16 The
plaintiff feared that if his wife received half of his stockholdings in the
6. 26 U.S.C. § 263 (1994); see Dana, 38 Fed. Cl. at 360.
7. See Gilmore, 372 U.S. at 44.
8. See Indopco, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 83-84 (1992); Corinne E. Anderson,
Note, A.E. Staley Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner: Life After lndopco: Tax Treatment of
Target Corporation 's Unsuccessful Hostile Tender Offer Defense Fees, 31 AKRON L. REV. 409, 414
(1998).
9. See infra notes 13-75 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 76-87 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 88-103 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 104-147 and accompanying text.
13. Gilmore, 372 U.S. at 49.
14. Id. at42-43.
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divorce proceeding, he would lose his controlling stock interest in three
corporations, which might cost him his corporate positions - positions
that were his principal means of livelihood. 7 The plaintiff also feared
that if he were found guilty of his wife's charges of marital infidelity, he
might lose his car dealer franchises - once again, principal means of the
plaintiff's livelihood.18 The plaintiff claimed that the portion of his legal
expenses used to defend against his wife's community property claims
over the plaintiffs stockholdings were deductible as ". . . ordinary and
necessary expenses... incurred during the taxable year... for the...




The Commissioner of Internal Revenue, however, found the
plaintiffs legal expenses to be nondeductible personal and family
expenses. 20  The United States Court of Claims disagreed with the
commissioner and held that 80% of plaintiff's legal expenses were due
to his defense against his wife's claims on his stockholdings, and were
deductible because the expenses were "incurred... for the
conservation... of property held for the production of income. 21 The
court of claims found it especially important in reaching its holding that
the plaintiff might be deprived of the means of earning a living if he lost
half his stockholdings.22
The United States Supreme Court rejected the view of the court of
claims, holding that courts should not look at the potential consequences
for the taxpayer's fortune, as the court of claims had, in order to
determine the deductibility of the taxpayers legal expenses. In so
doing, the Court chose to ignore the taxpayer's business motives or
purposes for incurring the legal expenses.24 Rather, the Court held that
courts must instead look to the "origin of the claim" with respect to
which the legal expense was incurred.25 The Court derived the "origin
of the claim test" from cases like Kornhauser v. United States.26 In
Kornhauser, the United States Supreme Court, in trying to discover the
deductibility of a taxpayer's litigation expenses, examined whether the
17. Id. at 42.
18. Id.
19. Gilmore, 372 U.S. at 40 (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 23(a)(2) (1952)).
20. Id. at 42.
21. Id. at 43 (quoting Gilmore v. United States, 290 F.2d 942,947 (Ct. CI. 1961)).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 49.
24. Edward J. Schnee & Nancy J. Star, The Origin of the Claim Test: A Search for
Objectivity, 13 AKRON TAX J. 97, 98 (1997).
25. Gilmore, 372 U.S at 49.
26. E.g., Komhauser v. United States, 276 U.S. 145 (1928).
2002]
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taxpayer's litigation expenses were "directly connected with" or
"proximately resulted from" his business.27 The Kornhauser Court
helped establish the important principle that the deductibility of a
taxpayer's expenditure depends on "whether or not the claim arises in
connection with the taxpayer's profit-seeking activities."
28
The "origin of the claim," as established by Gilmore and
Kornhauser, means the "'the nature of the activities to which [the legal
expenses] relate,"' 29 or, "'the kind of transaction out of which the
obligation arose..."' 30 In focusing on the "origin of the claim," courts
must ignore the impact that nondeductibility of the legal fees might have
on the taxpayer's fortune.3 In other words, it would be improper for a
court to consider any possible negative effects that not being able to
deduct the expenses would have on the taxpayer.
Applying the "origin of the claim test" to the facts in Gilmore, the
Court held that the origin of the plaintiff's claim was a divorce and was
the result of events in the taxpayer's personal life - not the result of
events from income-producing activity, as claimed by the plaintiff.
32
Therefore, the Court held that the legal expenses were not deductible
business expenses, but rather nondeductible personal expenses.33
B. Woodward v. Commissioner and the Extension of the "Origin of
theClaim Test" to Questions Involving Capitalization
In Woodward v. Commissioner,34 the United States Supreme Court
extended the "origin of the claim test" formulated in Gilmore from
merely applying to situations involving deductibility to situations
involving disputes over whether legal expenses were capitalizable.35
Gilmore, decided just seven years earlier by the United States Supreme
Court, had applied the "origin of the claim test" only to determine
whether an expense was deductible or not, and not whether it was
capitalizable or deductible.36
27. Id. at 153.
28. Gilmore, 372 U.S. at 48.
29. Id. at 46 (quoting Lykes v. United States, 343 U.S. 118, 123 (1952)).
30. Id, at 48 (quoting Deputy v. duPont, 308 U.S. 488, 494 (1940)).
31. See id. at 49; see also Schnee & Stara, supra note 24, at 98.
32. Gilmore, 372 U.S. at 51-52; See Schnee & Stara, supra note 24, at 100.
33. See Gilmore, 372 U.S. at 52.
34. Woodward v. Commissioner, 397 U.S. 572 (1970).
35. Id. at 578.
36. Remember that under the Internal Revenue Code, it is possible for an expense to be
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In Woodward, the plaintiffs controlled a majority of the common
stock of Telegraph-Herald.37 Plaintiffs voted for the perpetual extension
of the company's charter.38 A minority stockholder voted against such a
renewal.39 Under Iowa law the plaintiffs were therefore required to
purchase the stock of the minority shareholders voting against renewal.40
Since the plaintiffs were unsuccessful in negotiating a price at which to
purchase the minority shareholder's stock, the plaintiffs were forced to
ask a court to set the price. 41 The trial court fixed a value for the stock.
42
After purchasing the stock at a judicially determined price, the plaintiffs
sought to deduct the purchase price of the minority stock as "'ordinary
and necessary expenses paid... for the management, conservation, or
maintenance of property held for the production of income."
4 3
The commissioner for the IRS disallowed the deduction, calling it a
capital expenditure incurred in connection with the acquisition of capital
stock.4 The tax court agreed and the court of appeals affirmed.45
On further appeal, the United States Supreme Court stated that the
"origin of the claim" was the proper test to use to determine the nature of
the expense and that the origin was in the acquisition itself.46 The
expense was incurred at trial where the court set the price of the stock to
be acquired. The Court held that setting the price of the stock was
definitely part of the acquisition.48 Thus, the legal fees associated with
the appraisal of the stock price were capital expenditures and not
ordinary and necessary business deductions.49
C. Indopco, Inc. v. Commissioner and the "Separate and Distinct
Asset" and the "Future Benefit" Tests
In Indopco, Inc. v. Commissioner,50 the United States Supreme
Court reaffirmed the principle set forth in Commissioner v. Lincoln






43. Id. at 574 (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 212 (1954)).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 578-79.
47. Id. at 579.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 575.
50. lndopco, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79 (1992).
2002]
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Savings & Loan Association,5' that a taxpayer's expenditure which
"serves to create or enhance... a separate and distinct" asset should be
capitalized under Internal Revenue Code section 263.52 The Court
further held that "a taxpayer's realization of benefits beyond the year in
which the expenditure incurred is undeniably important in determining
whether the appropriate tax treatment is immediate deduction or
capitalization. 53 Therefore, put more simply, the Court held that while
a taxpayer's expenditure that serves to create or enhance a separate and
distinct asset should be capitalized, this is not a prerequisite to
capitalization. A taxpayer's realization of benefits beyond the year of
the expenditure is also an important factor in determining that the
expense should be capitalized.54 These two tests are referred to as the
"separate and distinct asset" and the "future benefit" tests.
In Indopco, Unilever United States, Inc. purchased Indopco, a
publicly held subsidiary corporation, in a friendly transaction.56 Indopco
claimed an ordinary and necessary business expense deduction under
Internal Revenue Code section 162 for the investment banking fees
involved.57  The IRS disallowed the deduction and Indopco sought a
redetermination in tax court, claiming not only the right to deduct the
investment banking fees, but the right to deduct the legal fees and
miscellaneous expenses as well.58  The tax court held that the
expenditures were capital in nature and therefore not deductible under
Internal Revenue Code section 162 as ordinary and necessary
expenses.59 The tax court, in reaching its holding, focused on the long-
term benefits that the taxpayer received from the acquisition of another
company. 60  The United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit,
affirmed, holding that the taxpayer would receive significant long-term
51. Commissioner v. Lincoln Savings & Loan Ass'n, 403 U.S. 345 (1971).
52. Indopco, 503 U.S. at 86 (quoting Commissioner v. Lincoln Savings & Loan Ass'n, 403
U.S. 345, 354 (1971)); see 26 U.S.C. § 263 (1994) ("No deduction shall be allowed for any amount
paid out for new buildings or for permanent improvements or betterments made to increase the
value of any property or estate .. ")
53. Indopco, 503 U.S. at 87 (emphasis added).
54. Id. at 88.
55. See id. at 87.
56. Id. at 80-82.
57. Indopco, 503 U.S. at 82. See also 26 U.S.C. § 162(a) (1994). ("There shall be allowed as
a deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in
carrying on any trade or business, .... ") (emphasis added).
58. Indopco, 503 U.S. at 82.
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benefits from the acquisition.6 1 The Third Circuit rejected the argument
that just because the acquisition did not create or enhance a separate or
distinct asset, it was not a capital expenditure and was thus deductible.
62
On appeal the United States Supreme Court held that the expenses
were not deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses under
Internal Revenue Code section 162, and therefore must be capitalized.63
The Court stated that if an expenditure "serves to create or enhance ... a
separate or distinct" asset it cannot be deducted as a business expense
and must be capitalized under Internal Revenue Code section 263.64
But, this does not mean that only expenses that create or enhance
separate or distinct assets are to be capitalized under section 263.65 The
Court held: "[A] taxpayer's realization of benefits beyond the year in
which the expenditure is incurred is undeniably important in determining
whether the appropriate tax treatment is immediate deduction or
capitalization. 66 So, even though the expenses do not create or enhance
an asset, the expenses might still be nondeductible capital expenditures
if they produce benefits to the company beyond the tax year in
question.
67
The Court found that Indopco gained benefits beyond the tax year
in question by being purchased by Unilever United States, Inc.68 These
benefits assume several forms. First, Indopco would benefit greatly
69from access to Unilever's vast resources in areas like basic technology.
Second, Indopco would benefit from the synergy that would result from
a merger.70 This synergy would exist because of the unique nature of the
Unilever's operations. Third, Indopco would benefit by changing from a
publicly held, freestanding corporation into a wholly owned subsidiary
of Unilever because Indopco would no longer have the costly
shareholder-relations expenses of a publicly traded corporation, nor the
reporting and disclosure obligations, derivitive suits, and proxy battles.7
61. Id. at 82-83 (citing National Starch & Chem. Corp. v. Commissioner, 918 F.2d 426, 432-
33 (1990).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 88.
64. Id. at 86-87; 26 U.S.C. § 263 (1994).
65. Indopco, 503 U.S. at 86-87.
66. Id. at 87.
67. See id. .
68. Id. at 88-89.
69. Id. at 88 (citing Breif for Petitioner at 39-40).
70. Id. (citing Brief for Petitioner at 77-78).
71. Id. at 89 (citing Breif for Petitioner at 24).
2002]
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D. The Relationship Between These Three Cases
The "origin of the claim test" requires a two-part inquiry: first, the
originating activity must be defined; second, the activity must be defined
as deductible or not.72 If not deductible, the activity might be a capital
expenditure. If not a capital expenditure, the activity is probably simply
nondeductible. Gilmore established the "origin of the claim test" to
determine the origin of legal expenses as regards the deductibility of the
expenses.73 Woodward extended "the origin of the claim test" into
determinations of the origin of legal expenses as regards the current
deductibility versus capitalization of the expenses.74 Indopco reiterated
the "separate and distinct asset" and the "future benefit" tests. 75 Once
the "origin of the claim" has been determined under the authority of the
Gilmore and Woodward precedent, the two tests from Indopco, the
"separate and distinct asset" and the "future benefit" tests, assist in the
second part of the "origin of the claim test;" that is, once the origin of
the activity that resulted in the legal expense has been defined, is such
expense deductible?
III. BACKGROUND OF DANA
A. Factual History
Dana Corporation (Dana) paid an annual legal retainer fee to a law
firm for sixteen consecutive years. 76 Dana paid the legal retainer fee to
the law firm to prevent the law firm from representing other companies
in any potential attempts to acquire Dana and also to have the right to
offset subsequent legal fees owed to the firm against the legal retainer
fee paid for the particular year.77 The right to offset legal fees against
the retainer allowed Dana the option of offsetting both deductible and
nondeductible legal fees.78
In most years, the IRS allowed Dana to deduct the legal retainer fee
as an ordinary and necessary business expense under Internal Revenue
Code section 162. 9 In 1984, however, Dana acquired Warner Electric
72. See Schnee & Stara, supra note 24, at 100-01
73. Gilmore, 372 U.S. at 49.
74. Woodward, 397 U.S. at 577-79.
75. Indopco, 503 U.S. at 86-87.
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Brake and Clutch Company (Warner). 80 Dana's law firm billed Dana
$265,000 for the services surrounding the acquisition, and offset this
charge by the $100,000 retainer. 8' Dana owed the law firm the
remaining $165,000, which Dana paid to the firm and then capitalized as
part the cost to acquire Warner. 82 Dana then deducted the $100,000
legal retainer fee.83 The IRS responded by classifying the $100,000
retainer fee as a nondeductible capital cost of the Warner acquisition.
84
B. Procedural Holding
1. The Court of Federal Claims
The Court of Federal Claims granted Dana's motion for summary
judgment, holding that the 1984 legal retainer fee was a deductible
ordinary and necessary business expense under Internal Revenue Code
section 162 even though it was used to offset the legal fees associated
with the acquisition of Warner.
85
2. The United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit
The United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit, reversed the
grant of summary judgment in favor of Dana.86 The Court of Appeals
held that under the "origin of the claim test" the retainer fee was a
capital expense, and therefore nondeductible, because the legal expenses
offset by the retainer fee were not ordinary and necessary business
expenses, but the costs of a capital acquisition under Internal Revenue
Code section 263.87
80. Id. at 1346.
81. Id. at 1347.
82. Dana, 174 F.3d at 1346-47.
83. Id. at 1347.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1345.
87. Id. at 1352; See 26 U.S.C. § 263 (1994).
2002]
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IV. THE COURTS' REASONING
A. The Court of Federal Claims
The Court of Federal Claims held that "the [1984] retainer ... had
an origin and character distinct from the legal fees later incurred., 88 In
other words, the origin of the claim was asset protection because Dana
paid the retainer in part to assure that its law firm did not represent
another company in an attempt to acquire Dana; the origin of the claim
was not an attempt to acquire assets. 89 The court also focused on Dana's
history of paying such retainers. 90  Since the retainers had been
deductible in the previous years, the court reasoned that they must be
deductible in 1984.91 Since Dana paid a new legal retainer in January of
each new year, the origin of the claim must occur in January when the
retainer is paid, and not later in the year when the retainer is used to
offset legal fees. 92 The court found that the legal retainer had an
"identity separate and distinct" from the legal services performed by the
law firm later in the year - services that the retainer was used to offset.
93
The court also found that Dana did not realize any benefits beyond 1984
from the transaction - the lack of future benefits tends to suggest that the
expense was not a capital expenditure.94
B. The United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit
The United States Court of Appeals reversed the Court of Federal
Claims's grant of summary judgment in favor of Dana.95 The Court of
Appeals held that under the "origin of the claim test" the 1984 retainer
fee was "a nondeductible pre-payment, or deposit, for legal services
rendered for a capital purchase. 96 Even though the retainer fees were
deductible in other years, the particular use of the 1984 retainer fee
determined its deductibility in 1984. 97 The language of the retainer
agreement can be particularly helpful in determining the deductibility of
88. Dana, 38 Fed. CI. at 362.
89. See id. at 361.
90. Id. at 361-62.
91. Id. at 361.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 362.
94. Id.
95. Dana, 174 F.3d at 1345.
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the retainer fee.98 Dana required the law firm, according to the language
of the retainer agreement, to treat the retainer fee as a deposit on any
subsequent legal services for that year.
99
Generally, retainer fees are deductible as ordinary and necessary
business expenses, unless there exists the right of offset against future
legal fees. 100 In other words, the retainer fee in Dana would be a
deductible business expense if the retainer agreement merely provided
that the law firm would protect Dana from hostile takeover attempts by
other corporations; i.e. asset protection. But, since the retainer
agreement provided that the retainer would also be used to offset
subsequent legal fees, the retainer's deductibility hinges upon the
purpose for which the subsequent legal fees are used.'0 ' Since the
retainer fee was used to offset legal fees incurred for a capital acquisition
(the acquisition of another company-Warner), the legal fees, and thus
the legal retainer used to offset the legal fees, are nondeductible.'0 2
Because the legal fees were offset by the retainer fee, the retainer fee
was not earned until the legal services had been credited.
0 3
V. ANALYSIS
Although the lower court's holding in Dana Corp. v. United States
is supported by limited precedent, the court of appeal's decision was
correct for several reasons.
A. Dana Corp. v. United States Followed the "Origin of the Claim
Test" in a Manner Consistent with Gilmore and Woodward
In Dana the United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit used
the "origin of the claim test" in accordance with the Supreme Court's
mandate in Gilmore and Woodward.104 Dana argued that the "origin of
the claim" was the payment of the legal retainer itself,'°5 which is
usually a deductible ordinary and necessary business expense under
Internal Revenue Code section 162.106 This argument might seem
persuasive at first because, after all, the IRS allowed Dana to deduct the
98. Seeid. at 1351.
99. Id.
100. See id.
101. Dana, 38 Fed. CI. at 1350-51.
102. Id. at 1350.
103. Id. at 1352.
104. Id. at 1350-51.
105. Id. at 1351.
106. See26U.S.C. § 162(a) (1994).
2002]
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legal retainer fee as a business expense in every year from 1976 to 1991,
with the exclusion of 1984 in which the IRS disallowed the deduction,
giving rise to this action.'0 7 But, Dana's argument ignores key facts.
First, in 1976, 1985-1988, 1990, and 1991, the law firm kept the retainer
fee but rendered almost no legal services for Dana.108 Since the retainer
fee was not used to pay for any legal services, the fee was indisputably
deductible under section 162 as a business expense. 109 Second, in six
other years the law firm rendered legal services for Dana, but all the
services were indisputably connected with "deductible (noncapital
acquisition) legal service fees."11
In three of the years, however, the law firm billed Dana for capital
acquisition fees. 1 ' Capital acquisition fees are nondeductible and must
instead be capitalized.1 12 In 1978, the law firm billed Dana for capital
acquisition fees and for reasons unexplained, the IRS allowed Dana to
deduct the majority of the fees.' 1 3 The IRS probably made a mistake. In
1984, the law firm once again rendered capital acquisition services for
Dana. 1 4 The legal fees were offset by the retainer fee as in 1978, but
this time the IRS did not allow Dana to deduct the retainer fee as a
business expense. 1 5 In its argument before the court, Dana erroneously
assumed that the actual payment of the retainer fee to the law firm in
1984 was the origin of the claim, or "the kind of transaction out of which
the obligation arose."' 1 6 In reality, since the legal retainer fee was a
prepayment of legal expenses that would arise later in that same year,
the origin of the legal retainer was whatever the legal retainer was used
to pay for.117 The court stated: "In each of those years, the retainer fee
must be seen as an expense incurred by Dana, not when it was initially
paid, but rather when Dana would have had to pay [the law firm] that




11. Id. at 1350.
112. 26 U.S.C. § 263 (1994).
113. See Dana, 174 F.3dat 1350.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Gilmore, 372 U.S. at 48 (quoting Deputy v. duPont, 308 U.S. 488, 494 (1940)).
117. See Dana, 174 F.3dat 1350-51.
[Vol. 17
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same fee for its services, if not for the pre-payment under the
retainer."'
1. The origin of the claim occurred in 1984, the year that Dana
paid the legal retainer fee
Dana argued, and the court of claims held, that Dana's history of
paying deductible legal retainers to the law firm established the retainer
in 1984 as an ordinary and necessary business expense under Internal
Revenue Code section 162.119 The court reasoned that there was a
pattern of paying retainer agreements every January; since the retainer
agreements were deductible in years prior to 1984, they must be
deductible in 1984.120 This reasoning is incorrect in that the lower court
failed to analyze the purpose of the fees each year. If a retainer that is
used to offset legal fees is deductible one year, that does not necessarily
mean that a retainer that is used to offset legal fees another year is
deductible. In the words of the federal circuit, "[T]he deductibility of
the retainer fee must rise and fall with the deductibility of the services
for which the retainer fee actually paid.' 12 1 As stated earlier, in 1984 the
fees were for a capital acquisition, and not for a clearly deductible
purpose as in other years.
122
2. The origin of the retainer fee hinges upon the language of the
retainer agreement
As mentioned earlier, Dana's legal retainer fee agreement with the
law firm ensured two things: 1) the law firm would not represent a
corporate raider in an attempt to acquire Dana; and 2) the law firm
would offset the legal fees that Dana incurred later in the year against
the pre-paid legal retainer fee from that same year.1 23  If the legal
retainer agreement had not contained an offset clause for subsequent
legal fees, the retainer would probably have been deductible because the
retainer fee would have served solely for asset protection. 124 In other
words, if the retainer agreement had only provided that the law firm
could not represent another company in a hostile takeover of Dana, the
118. Id. at 1351.
119. Dana, 38 Fed. CI. at 361; See 26 U.S.C. § 162(a) (1994).
120. Dana, 38 Fed. C1. at 361.
121. Dana, 174 F.3d at 1351.
122. Id. at 1350-51.
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court would not have looked at the use of the legal fees that the retainer
offset. On the one hand Dana's retainer agreement with the law firm
merely provided for deductible asset protection (no representation of a
corporate raider), but on the other hand the retainer agreement provided
for asset acquisition (where the retainer agreement offsets legal fees
incurred in the acquisition of another company).1 25
B. Dana's Legal Expenses Arose in Connection with a Profit-Seeking
Activity: the Second Prong of the "Origin of the Claim "Analysis
In United States v. Gilmore, the United States Supreme Court
stated: "[T]he characterization, as 'business' or 'personal,' of the
litigation costs of resisting a claim depends on whether or not the claim
arises in connection with the taxpayer's profit-seeking activities.", 
26
The "arises" part of the previous sentence refers to the "origin of the
claim," and the "profit-seeking activities" part of the sentence refers to
the deductibility of the "origin of the claim" once the origin has been
identified. Therefore, "the origin of the claim test" requires a two-part
inquiry; first, the originating activity must be defined; second, the
activity must be defined as deductible or not.1 27 Previously, this Note
explained that the origin of the legal retainer expense in Dana was the
legal fees which were offset by the retainer fee. 128 Next, the court in
Dana had to determine the deductibility of the legal fees themselves,
under the second part of the "origin of the claim test."
1 29
In Indopco, Inc. v. Commissioner, the United States Supreme Court
reiterated that an expense that creates or enhances a "separate and
distinct" asset is sufficient to require capitalization.130 This test is called
the "separate and distinct asset" test.1 3' The Court also held, "a
taxpayer's realization of benefits beyond the year in which the
expenditure is incurred is undeniably important in determining whether
the appropriate tax treatment is immediate deduction or
capitalization.' 32 This test is called the "future benefit" test. 33 Indeed,
Internal Revenue Code section 263, the Code's capitalization provision,
125. Id.
126. Gilmore, 372 U.S. at 48.
127. See Schnee & Stara, supra note 24, at 100-01.
128. See supra notes 76-84 and accompanying text.
129. Dana, 174 F.3d at 1351-52.
130. See Indopco, 503 U.S. at 86-87 (citing Lincoln Savings & Loan Ass'n, 403 U.S. 345, 351
(1971)).
131. Seeid.




Akron Tax Journal, Vol. 17 [2002], Art. 3
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akrontaxjournal/vol17/iss1/3
DANA CORPORATION V. UNITED STATES
refers to "permanent improvements or betterments, ' 34 suggesting the
importance of the duration and extent of the benefits realized by the
taxpayer.135 In other words, if a company incurs a legal fee in order to
create a benefit for the company that lasts beyond the current year, it is
likely that the legal fee will be capital, rather than deductible. In Dana,
the court of claims held that Dana did not realize any benefits beyond
the year in which the legal retainer was paid. 136 The court of claims
failed to see the future benefits Dana would receive from the acquisition
because the court of claims completely ignored the offset clause-portion
of the retainer agreement, instead focusing on the clause of the retainer
agreement that forbade Dana's law firm from representing a corporate
raider in an attempt to acquire Dana.' 37 Dana obviously did not receive
a benefit lasting beyond the year in question from the law firm not being
able to represent a corporate raider, because Dana would have to pay a
new retainer each year to receive that benefit.
This argument fails, however, because in 1984 Dana's prepaid legal
retainer fee offset legal fees incurred later the same year in the
acquisition of another company.138 Acquiring a company, unlike being
protected from a corporate raider, certainly benefited Dana beyond 1984
and is therefore a capital expenditure under Internal Revenue Code
section 263.139 By acquiring another company, Dana stood to benefit far
into the future from the synergy and hype that the acquisition would
create. In Indopco, the Court reiterated, "Courts have long recognized
that expenses... 'incurred for the purpose of changing the corporate
structure for the benefit of future operations are not ordinary and
necessary business expenses." '" 40 This was so obvious to the court of
appeals in Dana that the court simply stated, without further explanation,




The Court of Appeals, in using the "origin of the claim test" in
Dana, did not abandon the "separate and distinct asset" or the "future
134. 26 U.S.C. § 263 (1994).
135. Indopco, 503 U.S. at 88.
136. Dana, 38 Fed. Cl. at 361.
137. See Dana, 174 F.3dat 1351-52.
138. Id. at 1346-47.
139. Dana, 174 F.3d at 1351; See also Indopco, 503 U.S. at 89; A.E. Staley Mfg. v.
Commissioner, 119 F.3d 482, 489 (7th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted).
140. Indopco, 503 U.S. at 89 (quoting General Bancshares Corp. v. Commissioner, 326 F.2d
712, 715 (8th Cir. 1964) (internal citations omitted)).
141. Dana, 174F.3dat 1351.
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benefit" 142 tests from Indopco. Rather, the court of appeals first used the
Supreme Court's "origin of the claim test" from Gilmore to determine
that the origin of the claim was the legal fees (which were offset against
the legal retainer). 143 Then, the Court of Appeals, had it been necessary,
could have used the tests cited in Indopco, the "separate and distinct
asset" and the "future benefit" tests, to determine the deductibility of the
legal expenses. However the legal fees were so clearly capital (once
their origin had been determined), because they were used in an
acquisition that benefited Dana beyond the year in question, that the
Indopco tests were largely unnecessary. Or, if needed, the Indopco
analysis used by the court in Dana was so simple that the Court did not
bother to include it in the opinion.
C. The Likely Effect of Dana Corp. v. United States
If the Court of Appeals had held that the origin of the claim in
Dana was the payment of the legal retainer itself, as Dana argued, and as
the lower court held, companies would be able to rely on Dana to reduce
their tax liability for prepaid legal retainer fees. The companies would
reduce their tax liability by claiming an ordinary and necessary business
expense deduction under Internal Revenue Code section 162 for legal
expenses that are actually capital expenditures by simply paying for the
capital legal fees by offsetting the fees against a prepaid retainer fee.
Remember that "the time value of money renders current deductions
significantly more valuable to the taxpayer than future deductions."' 144
Putting it differently, the companies' tax liability would be reduced
under this scheme because current deductions for ordinary and necessary
business expense save the taxpayer-companies more money than do
capital expenditures which must be amortized and depreciated over the
relevant life of the asset. 145 This scheme would defeat the underlying
rationale behind section 162 and section 263 of the Internal Revenue
Code, which distinguish between expenditures that are deductible as
ordinary and necessary business expenses, and expenditures that must be
capitalized as capital expenditures. The rationale behind these sections
of the code is to diminish a taxpayer's ability to manipulate its taxable
income.146 In Federal Taxation of Income, Estates and Gifts, it states:
142. See Indopco, 503 U.S. at 87.
143. Dana, 174 F.3d at 1351-52.
144. Anderson, supra note 8, at 412.
145. See Indopco, 503 U.S. at 83-84; See also Anderson, supra note 8, at 414.
146. See Anderson, supra note 8, at 413.
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"[Section 263] serves to prevent a taxpayer from utilizing currently a
deduction properly attributable, through amortization, to later tax years
when the capital asset becomes income producing."'
' 47
But under the "origin of the claim test," as used in Dana,
companies will find it more difficult to reduce their tax liability through
pre-paid legal retainer fees. Under Dana, a court can cut to the core of
the expenditure to determine the purpose for which the legal fees were
incurred. Thus, Dana will help to assure that companies do not finesse
the tax treatment of their non deductible legal expenses by offsetting
them against legal retainer agreements. Under Dana, a company's
attempt to do this would be futile, because the court would hold that the
origin of the claim was not the payment of the retainer, but the legal fees
that the retainer offset later in the year in question.
Dana may also discourage some companies from giving law firms
pre-paid legal retainer fees in order to offset subsequent legal fees
because the companies will understand, in advance, that they cannot use
the retainer to transform the nondeductible legal fees into capital
expenditures. A retainer agreement with an offset clause could become
more of a hindrance than benefit for tax purposes; companies that used
retainers as a subterfuge in the past will no longer think it viable. Legal
fees paid by corporations, rather than being seen as separate and distinct
from retainer fees, could come to be seen as one and the same -
provided the retainer exists, at least in part, to offset the legal fees. One
might speculate that this is what Dana was consciously attempting to do
by claiming its deduction.
VI. CONCLUSION
The decision of the Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit in Dana was
ultimately correct for several reasons. First, the court correctly applied
the "origin of the claim test" to determine that the origin of Dana's claim
was not the payment of the legal retainer fee, but the subsequent legal
fees that the retainer offset. Second, the fact that the IRS had allowed
Dana to deduct the retainer fee as an ordinary and necessary business
expense in years past did not mean that the retainer fee was deductible as
such in 1984. The court in Dana correctly held that it is the use of the
retainer fee in a given year that determined the fee's deductibility. Since
the retainer fee was used to pay for a capital acquisition, the fee was a
nondeductible capital expenditure. Third, the origin of the retainer fee
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depended on the language of the retainer fee agreement itself. Since the
retainer fee agreement explicitly provided that the retainer fee offset
subsequent legal fees, the origin of the claim must necessarily be the
legal fees that the retainer offset. Fourth, the court did not abandon the
"separate and distinct asset" and the "future benefit" tests. The origin of
the claim in Dana was so clearly capital that an extensive analysis of the
legal fees was simply unnecessary. Fifth, the court adhered to important
public policy concerns, decreasing the ability of companies to reduce the
their tax liability for legal expenses by simply offsetting the expenses
against a pre-paid legal retainer fee.
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